

No. _____

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

MITCHELL J. STEIN,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

**On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit**

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTION PRESENTED

This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed “that a conviction, secured by the use of perjured testimony known to be such by the prosecuting attorney, is a denial of due process.” *White v. Ragen*, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945). “The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” *Napue v. Illinois*, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). When the prosecutor fails to fulfill his “duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth,” he “prevent[s] ... a trial that could in any real sense be termed fair.” *Id.* at 270.

The Eleventh Circuit here accepted that the government knowingly used false, material testimony to convict Mitchell Stein. The court nevertheless held that Stein received all the process he was due because the government did not suppress the evidence that proved its witnesses were, in fact, lying under oath.

The question presented is:

Whether the Due Process Clause excuses the government’s knowing use of false testimony where the government does not also suppress evidence indicating that the testimony was false.

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

This Court has long made clear that whenever the government “obtains a conviction through the use of perjured testimony, it violates civilized standards for the trial of guilt or innocence and thereby deprives an accused of liberty without due process of law.” *Hysler v. Florida*, 315 U.S. 411, 413 (1942). Thus, when the government knows that a witness for the prosecution has testified falsely, the prosecutor “has the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth.” *Napue v. Illinois*, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959). Failure to fulfill that duty “prevent[s] ... a trial that could in any real sense be termed fair,” *id.*, for the government’s knowing use of false testimony “involve[s] a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process,” *United States v. Agurs*, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). As a result, “[a] new trial is required if ‘the false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury ...’” *Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (quoting *Napue*, 360 U.S. at 271).

Despite these seemingly well-established bedrock principles, a number of federal and state courts—including the Eleventh Circuit in this case—have adopted rules excusing the government’s knowing use of false testimony in certain circumstances. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, for example, have declared that, in addition to showing a knowing use of false testimony, the defendant “generally must identify evidence the government withheld that would have revealed the falsity of the testimony.” App.19. “In other words, there is no violation of due process resulting from prosecutorial non-disclosure of false

testimony if defense counsel is aware of it and fails to object.” App.19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *Beltran v. Cockrell*, 294 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2002) (same). Other courts have reached a similar result under the rubric of waiver, refusing to set aside convictions obtained through the knowing use of false testimony if the defendant had contemporary knowledge of the falsity. *See, e.g., Ross v. Heyne*, 638 F.2d 979, 986 (7th Cir. 1980); *United States v. Crockett*, 435 F.3d 1305, 1318 (10th Cir. 2006); *DeVoss v. State*, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63-64 (Iowa 2002). In those jurisdictions, the government is free to pursue convictions through the knowing use of perjured testimony and to put the onus on the defense to demonstrate the falsity of the prosecution evidence. Thus, evidence that should never be knowingly used by any prosecutor to deprive an accused of his liberty is converted into just one more body of evidence that the defense must confront. *See, e.g., Crockett*, 435 F.3d at 1318 (“The government had disclosed this impeachment evidence and hence *Napue* is *inapposite*.”) (emphasis added).

Indeed, that is precisely what happened in this case. Although the Eleventh Circuit accepted that the government knowingly used false testimony to convict Mitchell Stein and send him to prison for 17 years, the court nonetheless held that there was no due process violation because the government did not also commit an independent constitutional violation by suppressing evidence proving that its witnesses were lying. While two wrongs do not make a right, in the Eleventh Circuit, in the absence of two wrongs (*i.e.*, a *Brady* violation and a *Giglio* violation), there is no wrong at all. App.26 (“In the absence of government

suppression of the evidence, ... there can be no *Giglio* violation.”).

Other federal Circuits and state supreme courts have flatly rejected this dilution of defendants’ due process guarantees. In unequivocal terms, these courts have held that “[t]he government’s duty to correct perjury by its witnesses is *not* discharged merely because defense counsel knows, and the jury may figure out, that the testimony was false.” *Soto v. Ryan*, 760 F.3d 947, 968 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added); *see also United States v. Foster*, 874 F.2d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 1988); *State v. Yates*, 629 A.2d 807, 809-10 (N.H. 1993); *People v. Smith*, 870 N.W.2d 299, 306 n.8 (Mich. 2015). As the Michigan Supreme Court has explained, while “secreting of evidence violates due process, ... so too does a prosecutor’s exploitation of false testimony by a state witness to gain a conviction, *whether done together with a failure to disclose or not.*” *Smith*, 870 N.W.2d at 306 n.8 (emphasis added). The reason is simple: even if a defendant knows about or tries to counter a government-sponsored lie, “perjury pollutes a trial, making it hard for jurors to see the truth.” *United States v. LaPage*, 231 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 2000). The government thus has an affirmative duty to erase the taint of its own witnesses’ false testimony. Shifting that burden to the defendant offends basic principles of due process.

With state and federal courts in sharp disagreement, the time is ripe for this Court to intervene and make clear that prosecutors are not authorized to knowingly rely on perjured testimony simply because they have disclosed evidence showing the testimony is false. While a prosecutor “may strike

hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones,” *Berger v. United States*, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), regardless whether the defendant has been given evidence showing that the blows are foul. And it hardly squares with principles of even-handed justice for petitioner to be facing a long prison sentence even though, if his trial had taken place in the Eighth or Ninth Circuits instead of the Eleventh, those courts would have treated the government’s deliberate reliance on false testimony as just what it was: a clear violation of petitioner’s right to due process. The petition should be granted.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 846 F.3d 1135 and reproduced at App.1-44. The district court’s unpublished order denying petitioner’s motion for new trial is reproduced at App.47-48.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals issued its opinion on January 18, 2017. Petitioner timely filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which the court denied on March 16, 2017. On May 25, 2017, Justice Thomas extended the time for filing this petition to and including July 14, 2017. On July 6, 2017, Justice Thomas further extended the time to file this petition to and including August 13, 2017. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment states in relevant part: “No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual Background

1. Signalife, Inc.¹ is a medical device company that specializes in developing and marketing electronic heart monitors. DE240:49-50; DE242:32, 172; DE453-16:7-8.² Between 2002 and 2005, the Company raised more than \$16 million in capital and achieved FDA clearance for its flagship device, the Fidelity 100, a compact, wireless ECG monitor. DE452-10:21; DE452-11:11; DE464-19:9, 19, 85; DE452-12; DE452-75:20-21; DE246:158-59. By the middle of 2005, the Company had six directors and four medical advisory board members, including scientists and doctors from Duke Clinical Research, the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, and the UCLA School of Medicine. DE452-75:38-42. At various times, Signalife's stock was listed on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board. DE240:57-58.

In July 2007, Signalife named Lowell T. Harmison, Ph.D., as its CEO. DE241:98-99. Dr. Harmison brought extensive experience to the position, having developed and patented the first fully implantable artificial heart, led another biomedical company, and served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health of the U.S. Public Health Service at the Department of Health and Human Services. DE464-19:93. Shortly after he became CEO,

¹ Signalife was formerly known as Recom Managed Systems, Inc., and later known as Heart Tronics, Inc.

² "DE" refers to docket entries in the district court proceedings below.

Harmison secured a \$100 million line of credit for the Company and began entering agreements involving the marketing, production, sales, and distribution of Signalife's products. DE241:171; DE464-19:73; DE452-9; DE453-19:60-136.

Petitioner Mitchell Stein served as legal counsel to Signalife. DE240:84; DE242:19.³ He worked closely with Harmison and was involved in drafting three press releases that would later become central to criminal fraud charges the government brought against Stein.

On September 20, 2007, Stein sent a draft press release to John Woodbury, Signalife's securities attorney, who reviewed the Company's impending press releases to ensure their compliance with AMEX rules. DE240:56-58. The press release stated that Signalife had sold nearly \$2 million of Fidelity 100 units "in its initial sales push being led by new management." DE240:61. Stein informed Woodbury that the release was supported by a purchase order, and Woodbury approved the release. DE240:59-60, 62-63.

On September 24, 2007, Stein emailed another draft press release to Woodbury that announced a \$3.3 million sales order as a "result of new management's initial sales campaign." DE240:64-66. Woodbury believed that Stein was actively involved in negotiating sales orders and did not ask him for supporting documentation. DE240:66-67. Woodbury approved the release the next day. DE240:67-68, 219.

³ Stein was married to Signalife's founder, who was also the company's largest single shareholder. App.4 n.3.

On October 9, 2007, Stein sent a third draft press release to Woodbury announcing that Signalife had had received a sales order of \$551,500. DE240:68-70. Woodbury did not doubt that an actual sales order supported the release, and he approved the release the next day. DE240:70-72.

Stein later emailed three purchase orders to Woodbury that corresponded to the press releases. DE240:73-79. These included a \$1.98 million purchase order dated September 14, 2007, for a company called Cardiac Hospital Management ("CHM"), DE453-9; a \$3.3 million purchase order dated September 24, 2007, for a company called IT Healthcare, DE453-10; and an additional purchase order for IT Healthcare for \$564,000, dated October 4, 2007, DE453-12.

2. A few weeks before these events, Thomas Tribou had entered into consulting and marketing agreements with Signalife related to the sales and distribution of Signalife's products. DE453-14:3-9. On September 28, 2007, a \$50,000 check from Tribou was deposited in Signalife's account. DE322-1:9. The check was dated the day before, and the memo line identified a purchase order number that matched the number on the CHM purchase order, the terms of which called for a \$50,000 down-payment. DE247:34, 38, 58; DE453-9:1.

Tracy Jones, the executive assistant to Dr. Harmison, received a copy of this check and a deposit slip indicating that the check had been deposited on September 28. DE241:30-31, 35. On October 24, Jones sent an email with copies of the check and deposit slip to Norma Provencio, a Signalife board

member and chairman of the board's audit committee. DE264-3; DE264-4; DE298-1:37-38; App.20-21. Later that day, Provencio forwarded these documents to Woodbury, who was responsible for gathering the documents needed to prepare Signalife's SEC filings. DE240:94. Provencio informed Woodbury that the documents represented "the \$50K deposit on the 9-14 purchase order" for CHM. DE264-3; *see also* DE264-4; DE298-1:37-38; App.20-21.

Harmison later incorporated information about these purchase orders into a March 2008 memorandum to Signalife's auditors. App.5-6. Signalife also filed reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") that detailed the orders. App.6

Harmison's tenure as CEO was cut short by a severe illness that caused him to resign in April 2008. DE240:225-26. Before his resignation, the Company experienced manufacturing problems regarding Bluetooth operability, after which it received a cancellation notification on two of the purchase orders that Harmison had signed. DE240:100,122; DE241:164-167. Harmison passed away on March 30, 2011. DE246:98.

B. Trial Proceedings

1. In December 2011, Stein was indicted for alleged crimes related to his work with Signalife. DE3. The government alleged that Stein had conspired with two other men, Ajay Anand and Martin Carter, in a scheme to disseminate false information about Signalife and to sell shares in the company at inflated prices. DE3:6. The government further alleged that the men conspired to conceal their

ownership and trading of Signalife stock, misappropriate Signalife assets, and testify falsely to the SEC to conceal their conduct. DE3:3.

Anand, the first alleged co-conspirator, began working as a consultant for Signalife in 2003. DE243:23. In 2007, Signalife management forced Anand's company to repay a significant portion of compensation it had received from Signalife based on Anand's company's poor performance. DE243:50.

Carter, the second alleged co-conspirator, was an electrician hired by Signalife to work on both distribution and new product development. DE452-3; DE244:14. Carter admitted at trial that, "to impress ... Stein," Carter had fabricated stories about having connections in Israel and Asia with individuals who were keenly interested in distributing Signalife products overseas. DE244:45. For example, before one of his business trips to Israel and Japan, Carter told Stein that he had spoken to his contacts "in Israel[,] Japan and the Philippines" who were "all ready to shoot the moon." DE452-50. Carter testified that this email was untrue, that it was sent to gain favor with Stein, and that he never spoke to anyone regarding distribution efforts for Signalife products in Asia. DE244:45, 55, 135-136.

Before Stein was indicted, Anand and Carter each pleaded guilty to one criminal count—Anand to obstruction of justice and Carter to conspiracy—and both agreed to testify against Stein. *See* DE453-34; DE453-35. In return, the government brought only one count each against them and agreed to recommend that they be given credit for cooperation

and receive lenient sentences. DE453-34:5-6; DE453-35:3-4.

2. When the government opened its case against Stein, it did not lead off with either Anand or Carter. Instead, in its attempt to prove that Stein “had the company put out fake good news about sales,” DE240:15, the government began its case with Woodbury (the securities lawyer) and Jones (the executive assistant).

To establish that Stein’s press releases were based on “fake good news,” the government alleged that there were no underlying purchases or purchase orders and Stein simply made them up. To that end, the prosecutor asked Woodbury whether, at the time he prepared SEC filings referring to the orders, he had “any additional independent information about these purchase orders other than what we’ve seen” at trial? DE240:96. Despite the fact that Provencio, the chairman of Signalife’s audit committee, had emailed Woodbury documentation showing that the Company had deposited a \$50,000 check for the September 14, 2007 order—documentation that the government both had in its files and produced to Stein before trial within a large electronic database—Woodbury responded: “No, I did not. I did not speak to Dr. Harmison. *I got all my information from Mr. Stein.*” *Id.* (emphasis added).

Jones took the stand next. As her testimony was nearing its end, the prosecutor embarked upon a series of increasingly leading questions about the purportedly fake nature of the purchase orders:

Q: Did you have a term in the office for the purchase orders?

A: Did I have a what in the office?

Q: A term. Did you have a term that you used to describe the purchase orders?

A: We would have just called it a purchase order or a sales requisition.

Q: Did you have a term that referenced the fact that you hadn't seen any invoices for the IT and Cardiac Healthcare purchase orders?

A: Well, I had a discussion with Lee Erlichman [sic] when he came to visit the office that I called them phantom purchase orders because *I never received any backup or anything on them.*

Q: What was that term? It was phantom?

A: Phantom. I believe that's what I said to him.

DE241:116-17 (emphasis added). Jones, however, *had* received backup documentation for the CHM order—the \$50,000 check and deposit slip, a copy of which she later forwarded to Provencio.⁴

Shortly before the close of trial, Stein—who represented himself throughout the trial—discovered among the voluminous materials disclosed by the government the critical email showing that this testimony was false. The email disclosed both that

⁴ Indeed, in a civil action the SEC brought against Stein, the SEC alleged that the September 14, 2007 order was real, but that Signalife's customer canceled the order because the Company "failed to ship any product to the Customer, blaming the delay on manufacturing problems beyond its control." Complaint ¶¶40, 43, *SEC v. Heart Tronics, Inc., et al.*, No. 8:11-cv-01962-JVS(ANx) (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 20, 2011), ECF No. 1.

Signalife had received payment for the CHM order and that both Woodbury and Jones, contrary to their testimony, were aware of this fact. Stein sought to admit the email, check, and deposit slip into evidence, but the government objected, and the sides debated the issue outside the jury's presence for nearly two days of the ten-day trial. *See* DE246:234-35; DE247:13-15, 57-59. The court ultimately sustained the government's objection. App.21. After the court expressed concern that the trial's conclusion might be delayed if witnesses had to travel to Florida to authenticate the documents, *see* DE247:43-47, Stein and the government agreed to the following stipulation, which was read to the jury: "On or about September 27th, 2007, an individual named Thomas Tribou paid Signalife \$50,000 for goods he expected to receive." DE247:71; App.21.

During its closing argument, the government hammered home its contention that Stein had created "fake purchase orders," DE248:23, to "get the stock price up, manipulate the market." DE248:31. The prosecutor asserted that Stein had lied to Woodbury and others, DE248:22, and specifically reminded the jury of Jones's reference to "phantom purchase orders." DE248:40. Stein was convicted on all counts. DE248:162-63; DE211.

C. Post-Trial Proceedings.

Stein moved for a new trial, arguing that the government had violated his due process rights by knowingly using false testimony to convict him. Stein contended that the email from Provencio to Woodbury definitively disproved Woodbury's assertion that the only information he received to substantiate the

purchase orders came from Stein. DE279:15-16. Stein likewise argued that Jones' statement that she "never received any backup or anything" for the purchase orders was directly contradicted by the email she had sent to Provencio. DE279:16-17.

In response, the government argued that Stein could not press a due process claim because the documents showing the falsity of its witnesses' testimony "were certainly not 'suppressed' or 'withheld' from" Stein. DE292:10. According to the government, Stein *first* had to establish a so-called "*Brady* violation," *see Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and then "[a]dditionally ... demonstrate that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony" that was material. DE292:4 (emphasis added). In a two-page order, the district court denied Stein's motion for new trial and his other post-trial motions without explaining its rationale for rejecting his due process argument. App.47-48.

Following Stein's conviction, Carter was sentenced to time served and three years of supervised release. He was ordered to pay \$2,156,000 in restitution jointly and severally with Stein. *See* Judgment, *United States v. Carter*, No. 1:11-cr-00278-RMC (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2013), ECF No. 57. Anand was sentenced to one year of probation and was not ordered to pay any restitution. Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order, *United States v. Anand*, No. 2:12-cr-00589-JAK (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2013), ECF No. 38. In Stein's case, the district court ruled that his alleged market manipulation caused \$13,186,025.85 of loss to 2,415 Signalife investors.

The court ordered Stein to pay \$13,186,025.85 in restitution and sentenced him to 17 years in prison. DE407, DE460.

D. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Stein's conviction. In addressing his due process claim, the court of appeals began from the premise that the government's knowing use of false testimony—what the Eleventh Circuit calls "*Giglio* error"—is merely "a species of *Brady* error" that "occurs when the *undisclosed* evidence demonstrates that the prosecution's case included perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury." App.18 (emphasis added). The court thus reasoned that it is not enough for the defendant to establish that the government knowingly used false testimony that was reasonably likely to affect the verdict. *Id.* Rather, the defendant "generally must [also] identify evidence the government withheld that would have revealed the falsity of the testimony." App.19. Absent a showing of suppressed evidence, it concluded, "there is no violation of due process" from knowing prosecutorial use of false testimony unless the government further "capitalizes on it" later in trial. *Id.*

The Eleventh Circuit then applied that standard to Stein's claims. The court did not dispute that Woodbury's or Jones' testimony was false and could have affected the verdict. App.25-26. Even so, the court held that the government's knowing use of this testimony did not violate Stein's due process rights because the government had not suppressed the evidence of its falsity, but rather had included the critical e-mail in the database it produced before the

trial. App.25-26. And while Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the government referenced the false testimony in closing argument, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the “the prosecutor did not emphasize or capitalize on [the false testimony] by repeating it or making it the centerpiece of an argument.” App.26 n.13.⁵

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The question presented in this case—whether the government is free to knowingly rely on false testimony in a criminal trial so long as the government does not also suppress evidence showing the falsity—has deeply divided the federal courts of appeals and state supreme courts, despite seemingly clear teaching from this Court. Although this Court “ha[s] often pointed out that a conviction, secured by the use

⁵ While the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Stein’s conviction, it reversed his sentence. *See* App.27-38. The district court held that each of the 2,415 investors who purchased Signalife stock between September 20, 2007 (when the first of the three press releases issued) and August 15, 2008 (when a public Signalife filing noted that IT Healthcare had cancelled its purchase order) relied on Stein’s statements, and that the entire drop in the stock’s value could be attributed to Stein. App.11-14. The Eleventh Circuit, however, held that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that these investors relied on information disseminated by Stein. App.33. The Eleventh Circuit also held that the district court failed to consider intervening factors that may have caused Signalife stock to lose value between September 2007 and August 2008, including short selling of Signalife stock and the overall decline in the stock market in 2008. App.37-38. The Eleventh Circuit thus vacated Stein’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. App.38-39. As Stein enters his fifth year of incarceration, those proceedings are ongoing.

of perjured testimony known to be such by the prosecuting attorney, is a denial of due process,” *White v. Ragen*, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945), various courts have imposed additional burdens on defendants, requiring them to also establish that the government suppressed evidence showing the testimony to be perjury or “capitalized” on the perjury after it was elicited. App.25-26. Those decisions effectively treat knowingly perjured testimony as no different from other evidence the defense must debunk and excuse the knowing use of perjury by prosecutors as long as they do not commit an independent constitutional violation by suppressing evidence that demonstrates the falsity of the testimony.

Multiple courts of appeals and state supreme courts have refused to go along with that stripped-down view of due process. Those courts have squarely held that, when a prosecutor knowingly uses false, material testimony to convict a defendant, the defendant has been deprived of due process, full stop, regardless whether the defendant has contemporary knowledge that the testimony is false. *See, e.g., Soto*, 760 F.3d at 968; *Foster*, 874 F.2d at 495; *Yates*, 629 A.2d at 809-10; *Smith*, 870 N.W.2d at 306 n.8. In doing so, the courts have emphasized that a defendant’s awareness of evidence showing the falsity of testimony does “not relieve the prosecutor of her overriding duty of candor to the court, and to seek justice rather than convictions.” *Foster*, 874 F.2d at 495. And they have recognized that only this approach adequately safeguards a defendant’s rights, for even when the government has not concealed the falsity of the testimony from the defendant, the lie still “pollutes

a trial, making it hard for jurors to see the truth.”
LaPage, 231 F.3d at 492.

These latter decisions, unlike the decision below, are faithful to this Court’s precedents and impose a meaningful sanction for prosecutors who knowingly exploit false evidence. The issue presented here goes to the heart of the integrity of our criminal justice system. This Court should send a clear signal that the knowing use of perjured testimony is never acceptable, and is not excused by the disclosure of materials that make clear to the defense and prosecutor alike that the prosecutor seeks a conviction by any means necessary. We have an adversary system of justice, but there are some constitutional limits that apply to the prosecutor no matter what the accused knows or does in response. And there is certainly no reason for the consequences of a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony to vary from Circuit to Circuit or from State to State. The Court should reaffirm its clear precedents and definitively settle this vital question, which has divided state and federal courts long enough.

I. This Case Involves A Deep And Persistent Split Among The Circuits And State Courts Of Last Resort.

This Court has long recognized that “a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State,” is incompatible with due process, and that this principle imposes a duty on the government both to refrain from “soliciting false evidence” and to correct it “when it appears.” *Napue*, 360 U.S. at 269; *see also Mooney v. Holohan*, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (government’s knowing use

of perjured testimony “to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation”). Given these clear, long-established principles, one would expect that convictions obtained by knowing use of false evidence that could have affected the outcome would universally be condemned as constitutionally intolerable. But that has not proved to be the case. As the First Circuit has pointed out, there is instead a “division within the circuits”—a division echoed in state Supreme Courts—regarding whether the government should be excused for its knowing exploitation of false evidence if the government disclosed evidence showing the falsity or the defendant otherwise knows that the testimony is false. *United States v. Mangual-Garcia*, 505 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007). And, far from receding with the passage of time, the division has become deeper and more pronounced.

1. Two federal courts of appeals and two state supreme courts have heeded this Court’s teachings and concluded that a defendant is denied due process whenever the government secures his conviction through the knowing use of false testimony, without regard to whether the defendant knew the testimony was false. For example, it has been clear in the Eighth Circuit for nearly three decades that when government witnesses provide testimony that the government knows to be false, the duty to correct that testimony falls solely on the government, not on the defendant. *United States v. Foster*, 874 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1988). In arriving at the conclusion, the court of appeals specifically stated that “[t]he fact that defense

counsel was also aware of [evidence revealing the falsity] is of no consequence.” *Id.* at 495. As the court pointedly explained, a defendant’s failure “to correct the prosecutor’s misrepresentation ... d[oes] not relieve the prosecutor of her overriding duty of candor to the court, and to seek justice rather than convictions.” *Id.*

In the Ninth Circuit as well, “the government’s duty to correct perjury by its witnesses is *not* discharged merely because defense counsel knows, and the jury may figure out, that the testimony is false.” *United States v. LaPage*, 231 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added); *see also Soto v. Ryan*, 760 F.3d 947, 968 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). Rather, the prosecutor has a “freestanding ethical and constitutional obligation ... as a representative of the government to protect the integrity of the court and the criminal justice system, as established [by this Court] in *Mooney* and *Berger*.” *N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie*, 243 F.3d 1109, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2001). Recognizing that “[a]ll perjury pollutes a trial, making it hard for jurors to see the truth,” *LaPage*, 231 F.3d at 492, the Ninth Circuit has adhered to the principle that it is “fundamentally unfair for a prosecutor to knowingly present perjury to the jury,” *id.* at 491, even when the defendant is aware that the testimony is perjurious.

The Michigan Supreme Court has recently adopted the same view, holding that the prosecution’s “obligation to avoid presenting false or misleading testimony of its own witness begins and ends with the prosecution” *People v. Smith*, 870 N.W.2d 299, 306 n.7 (2015). In a far-ranging examination of the issue,

the court expressly rejected the notion (pressed by a dissenting Justice) “that the prosecution’s duty to correct false testimony under *Napue* must be coupled with the separate, though often overlapping, duty to disclose exculpatory information under *Brady*,” *id.* at 306 n.8 (citations omitted), pointing out that such an approach “conflates the distinct prosecutorial duties to disclose exculpatory information, and to refrain from using false or misleading testimony to obtain a conviction,” *id.* at 305 n.6 (citation omitted). Although the court agreed that “the secreting of evidence violates due process,” the court went on to stress that “so too does a prosecutor’s exploitation of false testimony by a state witness to gain a conviction, whether done together with a failure to disclose or not.” *Id.* at 306 n.8.

Finally, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that a defendant is denied due process when the government knowingly uses false testimony, even when the defendant could have, but failed to, cross-examine a government witness about his lies. *State v. Yates*, 629 A.2d 807, 809-10 (N.H. 1993). As the court emphasized, “the final responsibility rest[s] with the prosecutor, not [the defendant], to bring to the attention of the court and the jury” falsehoods uttered by government witnesses. *Id.* at 810.

2. Standing on the other side of the split are courts of appeals and state supreme courts that are willing to excuse the government’s knowing use of false evidence if the defendant possessed evidence showing it was false. In the decision below, for example, the Eleventh Circuit held that, even when the government knowingly uses false testimony to convict a defendant,

the defendant cannot establish a due process violation unless he also “identif[ies] evidence the government withheld that would have revealed the falsity of the testimony” or the government “capitalize[s]” on the false testimony in closing argument. In other words, in the absence of violating *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or making the false testimony the “centerpiece” of the government’s case, App.19 & App.26 n.13, there can be no due process violation for knowingly using false testimony to convict.

Other federal courts of appeals and state courts have staked out the same ground, holding that a breach of the government’s use of false evidence that may have affected the outcome does not necessarily violate due process. For example, the Tenth Circuit expressly distinguished—and, consequently, declined to follow—this Court’s decision in *Napue*, on the ground that, in the case before it, “[t]he government had disclosed th[e] impeachment evidence and hence *Napue* is inapposite.” *Crockett*, 435 F.3d at 1318. The Seventh Circuit, for its part, will not find a due process violation “[w]hen a criminal defendant, during his trial, has reason to believe that perjured testimony was employed by the prosecution” and fails to “impeach the testimony at the trial.” *Ross*, 638 F.2d at 986. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Iowa rejected a defendant’s due process challenge to the deliberate use of false evidence against her because “she had reason to know of the falsity of the subject testimony,” but “faile[d] to raise it at trial.” *DeVoss*, 648 N.W.2d at 63-64. Other courts, too, uphold convictions on the basis of the defendant’s knowledge, either upon finding or “assum[ing]” that the defendant’s failure to challenge perjury is “for strategic reasons.” *United*

States v. Mangual-Garcia, 505 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2007); *see also United States v. Harris*, 498 F.2d 1164, 1170 (3d Cir. 1974); *United States v. Meinster*, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980)⁶; *Beltran v. Cockrell*, 294 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2002); *United States v. Iverson*, 648 F.2d 737, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1981); *Meece v. Commonwealth*, 348 S.W.3d 627, 679-80 (Ky. 2011); *People v. Nash*, 222 N.E.2d 473, 478 (Ill. 1966).

The division in the courts on this issue is deep and abiding. At least eleven Circuits and five state supreme courts have now addressed whether “[t]he principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence ... to obtain a tainted conviction” is rendered inapplicable when the defendant also has knowledge that the evidence is false. *Napue*, 360 U.S. at 269. The courts are unquestionably of different minds on the issue, and there is no basis for supposing that, given a little more time, one side or the other will suddenly capitulate to the opposite view. Hence, only this Court can provide a definitive answer to a question that, despite its apparent simplicity, touches on the obligations of criminal prosecutors, the essential rights of criminal defendants, and the integrity of our judicial system. For that reason alone, the petition should be granted.

⁶ *But see United States v. Cargill*, 17 F. App’x 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The fact that defense counsel was also aware of the [evidence] but failed to correct the prosecutor’s misrepresentation is of no consequence. This did not relieve the prosecutor of her overriding duty of candor to the court, and to seek justice rather than convictions.”) (quoting *Foster*, 874 F.2d at 495).

II. The Decision Below Is Wrong.

This Court's review is further warranted because the Eleventh Circuit's layering of a suppression requirement on top of false-evidence claims is incompatible with "the rudimentary demands of justice." *Mooney*, 294 U.S. at 112. Since *Mooney*, this Court has recognized that a conviction cannot stand if it is obtained "through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured." *Id.* And in *Napue*, the Court made clear that "[t]he same result obtains when the" government allows false testimony "to go uncorrected when it appears." 360 U.S. at 269. This duty reflects the principle that a prosecutor "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all." *Berger v. United States*, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Hence, "[i]t is as much [a prosecutor's] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." *Id.*

It should be self-evident that, if the government deliberately uses false testimony against an accused, the trial is not rendered fair merely because the government discloses evidence showing its witnesses are perjuring themselves or the accused otherwise knows he is being railroaded. Concluding that the knowing use of false testimony does not violate due process "[i]n the absence of government suppression of the evidence," App.26, the Eleventh Circuit wrongly merged the government's duty to provide exculpatory evidence under *Brady* with its duty not to knowingly

introduce false evidence under *Napue*. See *Smith*, 870 N.W.2d at 305 n.6. Although the Court in *Brady* and *Giglio* extended its caselaw by holding that the government's suppression of exculpatory evidence could *itself* violate due process, 373 U.S. at 87, this Court did not take one step forward and two steps back. Nothing in *Brady*, or any other decision of this Court, remotely stands for the proposition that the government's observance of its *Brady* obligations relieves it of its separate, wholly independent, and previously recognized duty to refrain from seeking convictions through false evidence. The government can violate *Brady* but comply with *Napue/Mooney* or, as in this case, it can comply with *Brady* and yet violate *Napue/Mooney*. Either way, the absence of two wrongs does not make a right.

Having jumbled together two different government duties, the Eleventh Circuit also failed to recognize a critical distinction between a *Brady* violation and a false testimony violation. If the government has improperly withheld evidence under *Brady*, but a defendant obtains that same evidence through other means before trial, the defendant is fully able to present the evidence in his defense. Thus, even though the government has unquestionably breached its constitutional obligation, the trial itself is ultimately unaffected. That is simply not true with respect to the government's resort to false testimony. Even if the defendant acquires evidence of the falsity before trial (whether from the government or from another source), the government's introduction of, and reliance on, the false testimony necessarily distorts the nature of the trial itself. The defendant can try to counter the false testimony, but, as the government

presumably realized in deciding to offer it, the stain of that testimony nonetheless will remain.

A defendant's knowledge of false testimony is thus no antidote to the prosecution's use of it. As the Court has made clear: "[T]he knowing use of perjured testimony involves ... a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process." *United States v. Bagley*, 473 U.S. 667, 680 (1985). "A lie is a lie ... and, if it is in any way relevant to the case, the [prosecutor] has the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth." *Napue*, 360 U.S. at 269-70. In light of this background understanding, it is particularly perverse for courts to fault the accused for failing to perform the *government's* duty of detoxifying its own false evidence.

Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit implicitly recognized as much by creating an otherwise inexplicable "capitalization" exception to its general rule requiring suppression. The capitalization exception provides that, even when a defendant knows the government is using perjury and fails to correct it, he can still show he was denied due process by establishing that "the government not only fail[ed] to correct materially false testimony but also affirmatively capitalize[d] on it." App.19. This alternative means of establishing a constitutional violation makes no sense. To begin with, the prosecutor's decision to introduce false testimony, or to leave it uncorrected, is "capitalization" enough: it should make no constitutional difference whether the prosecutor calls still more attention to it in his closing argument. Furthermore, it hardly makes sense to place

potentially decisive weight on the prosecutor's argument—which, after all, is not evidence—while discounting the impact of the evidence itself. Perjured evidence is perjured evidence, whether or not the prosecutor compounds the error by stressing the perjury in closing argument. Thus, the only coherent reason to have a capitalization exception to the Eleventh Circuit's suppression requirement is because the suppression rule is inconsistent with due process—i.e., the exception disproves the rule.

Several courts aligned with the Eleventh Circuit have tried to justify the additional requirements they have layered on *Napue* and *Mooney* by raising concerns about defense gamesmanship. *See, e.g., Ross*, 638 F.2d at 986; *Mangual-Garcia*, 505 F.3d at 10-11. In their view, a flat prohibition on the prosecution's introduction of false testimony would permit defendants, armed with knowledge of the falsity, to just sit back, counting on the prospect that, if they are convicted, they will have a claim for a new trial. *See, e.g., Ross*, 638 F.2d at 986. The success of this tactic would rise or fall on an enormously risky bet and it is unclear whether this reasoning applies here, given that Stein tried to introduce the evidence showing the falsity of the testimony at issue. But at any rate, there are important institutional reasons to reject that justification for tolerating verdicts obtained through false testimony.

First, as the Michigan Supreme Court recognized, placing full responsibility on the government “to avoid presenting false or misleading testimony of its own witness ... is prudent in the unique *Napue* context because *Napue* requires the prosecution's knowledge

of the false or misleading testimony of its own witnesses.” *Smith*, 870 N.W.2d at 306 n.7. Given that there can be no due process violation unless the government *knowingly* uses false testimony, concerns about dubious defense tactics—overblown to begin with—are actually focused on the wrong target. After all, any hypothetical “Get Out Of Jail Free Card” is by definition one that the government has knowingly given to the defendant and can readily take back by simply correcting the false testimony. If the government refuses to do so, it can hardly complain that the defense is improperly taking advantage of its unscrupulous decision.

Second, any defendant forced to correct a government-sponsored falsehood begins at a severe disadvantage. “The jury understands defense counsel’s duty of advocacy and frequently listens to defense counsel with skepticism.” *LaPage*, 231 F.3d at 492. But, as this Court long ago observed, “the average jury” has unique “confidence” in prosecutors precisely because jurors know that prosecutors have a “duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction” and expect that this duty “will be faithfully observed.” *Berger*, 295 U.S. at 88. When the government ignores that duty, therefore, it is properly charged with the task of cleaning up its own mess. Shifting that obligation to the defendant creates an intolerable risk that the government’s “improper suggestions” and “insinuations ... are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none.” *Id.*

Third, as this case and others show, it is no mean feat to pin down a government witness in a lie. In *LaPage*, for example, defense counsel undertook the task of proving that the government's witness had lied, but the "witness evaded defense counsel's ineffectual cross-examination." 231 F.3d at 492. In other cases, the only effective means for the defense to expose the testimony as a lie would be to sacrifice the defendant's constitutional right not to take the stand. And in other cases, the evidence that furnishes the defendant with knowledge of the falsity may be inadmissible. See *United States v. Rodriguez*, 496 F.3d 221, 226 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that "the Government's obligations under *Brady* to disclose such information does not depend on whether the information to be disclosed is admissible as evidence in its present form"). This case, in fact, illustrates that very problem: at trial, the government successfully opposed Stein's pro se attempt to admit the email and check that would have proved Woodbury's and Jones' testimony to be false. App.21.

Finally, and most fundamentally, the Eleventh Circuit's approach fails to give sufficient weight to the judiciary's "independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." *Wheat v. United States*, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988). To serve that interest, prosecutors have ethical duties to refrain from introducing false evidence and to correct it when it is discovered. See *Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function* §3-6.6 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2015); *National Prosecution Standards* §6-1.3 (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 2009). And the prosecutor's knowing

use of false testimony “invites disrespect for the integrity of the court.” *Wheat*, 486 U.S. at 162. Given the acute threat to the integrity of the system posed by the prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony, the only appropriate constitutional response is a policy of zero tolerance. A little knowing use of perjured testimony by prosecutors goes a long way in undermining the public confidence in the integrity of criminal proceedings on which our justice system depends. “The government of a strong and free nation does not need convictions based upon such testimony. It cannot afford to abide with them.” *Mesarosh v. United States*, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956).

III. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle To Address This Exceptionally Important Issue.

This case is a particularly well-suited vehicle for resolving this entrenched split. Stein raised his challenge in a motion for new trial before the district court, and the Eleventh Circuit issued its erroneous decision on direct appeal. Thus, the Court can consider this legal issue *de novo*, without being limited by deferential standards of collateral or plain error review. *See, e.g., Shih Wei Su v. Fillion*, 335 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir. 2003).

Moreover, this case is free of fact-bound issues regarding whether the testimony was false or what the government knew. The Eleventh Circuit did not dispute that (1) Jones and Woodbury had testified falsely and (2) the government knew about the falsity. App.25-26. The Eleventh Circuit nonetheless found no due process violation. In the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, as well as the Michigan and New Hampshire Supreme Courts, those two facts would be sufficient to

guarantee reversal. The split is thus squarely presented.

It makes no difference that the Eleventh Circuit also found that the government did not “capitalize” on the false testimony during closing argument. App.25 n.13. “[A] conviction obtained by the knowing use of false testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s verdict.” *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 679 n.9 (citing *Napue*). As the government itself has “concede[d]” in the past, this standard “is equivalent to the *Chapman* harmless-error standard,” which requires the government “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” *Id.* (quoting *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Whatever exactly the Eleventh Circuit’s “capitalization” test means (for the court of appeals seemingly invented it out of whole cloth), it is miles away from the *Napue/Chapman* test for awarding the defendant a new trial. Perjured evidence is perjured evidence, whether or not the prosecutor compounds the error by stressing the perjury in closing argument. And the government’s use of false testimony here was plainly not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finally, the question presented is critically important, as the Eleventh Circuit’s rule undermines the only truly effective check on prosecutorial misconduct. While a sense of duty surely leads most prosecutors to avoid or correct the use of false testimony, there are few other restraints on such serious misconduct beyond the fear of losing a valid conviction. One recent study found that, since 1985,

Massachusetts appellate courts have reversed convictions at least 120 times in whole or in part based on prosecutorial misconduct or error. *See* Shawn Musgrave, *Scant Discipline Follows Prosecutors' Impropriety in Massachusetts*, New England Ctr. for Investigative Reporting (Mar. 6, 2017), <http://bit.ly/2lTofQ0>. Yet records from the state bar's disciplinary board show that, since 1980, only two prosecutors have been publicly disciplined and only nine have been privately admonished. *Id.* An analysis of similar cases involving misconduct by New York City prosecutors revealed that, out of 30 cases of misconduct warranting a new trial or civil damages for victims of misconduct, only one prosecutor received so much as a censure by the state bar's disciplinary committee. *See* Joaquin Sapien and Sergio Hernandez, *Who Polices Prosecutors Who Abuse Their Authority? Usually Nobody*, ProPublica (Apr. 3, 2013), <http://bit.ly/2hLbgm3>; *see also* Richard A. Rosen, *Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger*, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 693, 731 (1987) (concluding that "the instances of discipline are too rare, and the sanctions most often imposed too lenient, to support a reliance on the disciplinary codes ... to deter *Brady*-type misconduct"). The unfortunate reality, therefore, is that if "courts don't *make* them care" about their *Napue* obligations, there are very few other mechanisms to make prosecutors care. *United States v. Olsen*, 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the petition.

Respectfully submitted,

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August 14, 2017

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Appendix A

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT**

No. 14-15621

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MITCHELL J. STEIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida

(January 18, 2017)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR and JILL PRYOR, Circuit
Judges, and STORY, * District Judge.

JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

After a two-week trial, Mitchell Stein, a lawyer, was convicted of mail, wire, and securities fraud based on evidence that he fabricated press releases and purchase orders to inflate the stock price of his client Signalife, Inc., a publicly-traded manufacturer of medical devices. The district court sentenced Mr. Stein to 204 months' imprisonment, over \$5 million

* Honorable Richard W. Story, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.

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in forfeiture, and over \$13 million in restitution. Mr. Stein appeals his conviction and sentence.

Regarding his conviction, Mr. Stein argues, among other points, that the government failed to disclose *Brady* material¹ to the defense before trial and knowingly relied on false testimony to make its case. As regards his sentence, Mr. Stein argues that the district court erred in calculating actual loss for the purposes of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, and § 2B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. In particular, he argues that in estimating actual loss the district court erroneously presumed that all purchasers of Signalife stock during the period when the fraud was ongoing relied on false information Mr. Stein promulgated. He also argues that the district court failed to take into account other market forces that likely contributed to the investors’ losses. After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm Mr. Stein’s conviction but vacate his sentence.

This opinion proceeds in three parts. We first provide background regarding Mr. Stein’s fraudulent scheme, his subsequent indictment, his pretrial and post-trial motions, and his sentencing. Second, we address and reject Mr. Stein’s challenges to his conviction. Mr. Stein identified only one potential *Brady* document, and it contained no information favorable to him and was accessible through reasonable diligence before trial. And, he failed to identify any suppressed material or any materially

¹ *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

false testimony on which the government relied, purportedly in violation of *Giglio*.²

Third, with respect to sentencing, we review the district court's actual loss calculation. We agree with Mr. Stein that to establish an actual loss figure under the guidelines or the MVRA based on investors' losses, the government must prove that, in deciding to purchase Signalife stock, investors relied on the fraudulent information Mr. Stein disseminated. The district court found that more than 2,000 investors relied on Mr. Stein's fraudulent information, but the only evidence supporting this finding was the testimony of two individuals that they relied on Mr. Stein's false press releases and generalized evidence that some investors may rely on some public information. This evidence was insufficient to permit reliance to be inferred for over 2,000 investors. Accordingly, the district court erred in calculating an actual loss figure based on the losses of all these investors. The district court also failed to determine whether intervening events caused the Signalife stock price to drop and, if so, whether these events were unforeseeable such that their effects should be subtracted from the actual loss figure. We remand so that the district court can remedy these errors.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Fraudulent Scheme

The evidence adduced at trial—including the testimony of Mr. Stein's two co-conspirators, Martin Carter and Ajay Anand—supported the following

² *Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

facts. In an effort to inflate artificially the value of Signalife stock, Mr. Stein drafted three press releases and three corresponding purchase orders touting more than \$5 million in bogus Signalife sales.³ The fraudulent period began on September 20, 2007, when Mr. Stein sent the first false press release to John Woodbury, Signalife's securities lawyer, with instructions to publish it. The press release reported that Signalife had sold \$1.98 million worth of its products. Mr. Stein represented that the press release was "backed up by a purchase order." Trial Tr., Doc. 240 at 59.⁴ Mr. Woodbury lacked any independent knowledge of the truth of the statements in the press release. He published it that day anyway, though, because Mr. Stein had told him that he and Signalife's Chief Executive Officer, Lowell T. Harmison, were traveling together visiting potential clients, and Mr. Woodbury believed that this sale was the fruit of those efforts.

A few days later, Mr. Stein emailed Mr. Woodbury a second press release about an additional \$3.3 million in sales and represented that Mr. Harmison had approved the press release. Mr. Woodbury published the release the next day despite lacking any supporting documentation.

³ Signalife was formerly known as Recom Managed Systems, Inc., and later known as Heart Tronics, Inc. Mr. Stein's wife at the time of the false purchase orders, Tracey Hampton-Stein, was the founder of Signalife and the largest single Signalife shareholder. Thus, Mr. Stein stood to gain directly from the stock's inflated price.

⁴ "Doc." refers to the numbered entry onto the district court's docket in this case. The trial transcript is found at Doc. 239 through Doc. 248.

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Mr. Stein emailed Mr. Woodbury a third press release about two weeks later. The press release reported an additional \$551,500 in sales orders. Mr. Woodbury issued the release early the next morning, again without supporting documentation.

Mr. Woodbury later asked Mr. Stein for additional information regarding the sales that were described in the press releases. In response, Mr. Stein sent Mr. Woodbury three purchase orders. None of these purchase orders provided an address for shipment. Tracey Jones, Mr. Harmison's assistant, maintained that she "never received any backup or anything on" the purchase orders, and thus she considered them "phantom purchase orders." Doc. 241 at 117.

The first purchase order, dated September 14, 2007, reflected an order by a company called Cardiac Hospital Management ("CHM"). The order reflected a sale of \$1.93 million worth of product and noted a \$50,000 deposit. The signature block showed "Cardiac Hospital Management" and an illegible signature without a name. A week after the date of the purchase order, Thomas Tribou, a consultant who had worked with Signalife, paid Signalife \$50,000 for goods he expected to receive.

The second and third purchase orders, dated September 24, 2007 and October 4, 2007, respectively, reflected sales to a company called IT Healthcare. One order reflected a sale of products at a cost of \$3.3 million and noted a \$30,000 deposit. The other reflected a sale with a "net due" amount of \$551,500.

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The facts of these purchase orders resurfaced several times. Mr. Harmison incorporated information about them in a March 2008 memorandum to Signalife's auditors. Likewise, Signalife filed reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") that detailed these orders. According to Mr. Woodbury, who oversaw the drafting of the SEC filings, Mr. Stein was the sole source of information about the purchase orders and was intimately involved in the drafting process.

Mr. Stein used the help of his personal assistant, Mr. Carter, and a Signalife contractor, Mr. Anand, to make the fake purchase orders appear legitimate. For example, Mr. Stein gave Mr. Carter a template to create bogus letters requesting a change of shipment address, one for IT Healthcare and another for CHM. Mr. Carter drafted a letter ostensibly from a man named Yossie Keret of IT Healthcare requesting that products be delivered to an address in Israel that Mr. Carter made up. Mr. Carter also prepared a letter appearing to come from CHM that asked for products to be delivered to an address in Tokyo, Japan. This letter purportedly was signed by "Toni Nonoy." Mr. Carter never spoke with Yossie Keret, Toni Nonoy, or anyone at IT Healthcare or CHM; indeed, he had no idea whether the companies or the individuals actually existed. He believed, however, that Mr. Stein had fabricated these names.

Mr. Stein directed Mr. Carter to help him with the fraud in other ways as well. Mr. Stein asked Mr. Carter for two numbers he could use as fax numbers for purchase confirmation letters from Yossie Keret and Toni Nonoy. Mr. Carter provided Mr. Stein with

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two numbers unaffiliated with either company or person. Then, in June 2008, Mr. Stein told Mr. Carter to fabricate a letter from Yossie Keret purporting to cancel IT Healthcare's orders. Mr. Carter did as he was told and sent the letter to Mr. Woodbury. At one point, Mr. Stein arranged for Mr. Carter to travel to Israel ostensibly to find customers for Signalife even though Mr. Carter had no business contacts there. On another occasion, Mr. Stein sent Mr. Carter to Japan with a sealed envelope in a plastic bag, instructing him to mail the envelope back to the United States while wearing gloves and then return home the same day.

Mr. Stein similarly relied on Mr. Anand for help in perpetrating the fraud. Once Mr. Stein asked Mr. Anand to travel to Texas to mail two IT Healthcare purchase orders to Signalife. When Mr. Anand asked whether the purchase orders were real, Mr. Stein responded that it did not matter. Mr. Anand declined to help, but later, on Mr. Stein's request, he agreed to draft two letters that would appear to come from Yossie Keret on behalf of IT Healthcare. The first letter requested a shipping address change to an Israeli address. The second letter cancelled the Signalife order. Mr. Anand sent these letters to Mr. Stein and Mr. Harmison.

Mr. Stein also used Carter and Anand to take money or stock from Signalife. At Mr. Stein's direction, in January 2008, Mr. Carter executed an agreement with Signalife to provide consulting services, none of which he actually provided or was capable of providing. Pursuant to this agreement, Mr. Stein funneled money and Signalife stock from

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Signalife through Mr. Carter to himself. Mr. Stein also directed Mr. Carter to buy and sell Signalife stock and transfer most of the proceeds to him. Likewise, at Mr. Stein's direction, Mr. Anand established "The Silve Group," ostensibly to sell Signalife products in India. But Mr. Anand sold only one unit (in Mexico). Mr. Stein nonetheless arranged for Signalife to pay Mr. Anand more than one million shares for his work. Mr. Anand then gave Mr. Stein a "kickback . . . [f]or the sweet deal [he] got from Mr. Stein." Doc. 243 at 71.

On August 15, 2008, Signalife filed a Form 10-Q for the second quarter of 2008, which described the cancellation of an IT Healthcare purchase order. (GX 159 at 22.) This was the first public disclosure arguably signaling to stock market participants that Signalife's stock was overvalued based on the IT Healthcare purchase order, and thus, as the district court found, marked the end of the fraudulent period.

B. Procedural Background

1. The Investigation and Indictment

The SEC began investigating Signalife in 2009. During its investigation, the SEC amassed a database of about 200 million records produced by Signalife. In 2010, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") began a criminal investigation of Mr. Stein. As a result of the DOJ's investigation, a grand jury indicted Mr. Stein on charges of money laundering; mail, wire and securities fraud; conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud; and conspiracy to obstruct justice. The indictment also charged that Mr. Stein obstructed justice by giving false testimony to SEC investigators. Mr. Stein's two

co-conspirators, Mr. Carter and Mr. Anand, also were indicted. Both pled guilty to conspiracy charges and testified against Mr. Stein at trial.

2. The Motion to Compel

Before trial, Mr. Stein sent the government nine letters requesting over 100 categories of documents, including documents in the SEC's files. The DOJ refused to produce information that was "not in the possession of or known to the prosecution," which included the documents in the SEC's files. Mot. Compel Ex. B, Doc. 41-2 at 3. Mr. Stein responded with a motion to compel. The government opposed the motion, arguing that the DOJ lacked control over the SEC and that the DOJ and the SEC conducted no joint investigation. The magistrate judge denied the motion to compel as to documents "in the sole custody of the SEC, and which the DOJ is unaware of." Doc. 63 at 2.

3. The Pretrial Motion to Dismiss the Indictment

About two months before trial, at Mr. Stein's direction, his attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, which was granted. Mr. Stein then filed a motion to proceed *pro se*. The court held a *Faretta*⁵ hearing and then granted Mr. Stein's motion. During the hearing, Mr. Stein learned that in the course of its investigation the DOJ had accessed a "very small subset" of documents in the SEC's database, which the DOJ had then provided to him. Tr. of *Faretta* Hrg. Proceedings, Doc. 146 at 41. Based on this revelation, Mr. Stein promptly filed a *pro se* motion

⁵ *Faretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

to dismiss the indictment, alleging the suppression of unidentified “*Brady* material” in the SEC database. Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. 150 at 17-22. Mr. Stein also requested an evidentiary hearing. The district court denied the motion, concluding, among other things, that the motion was untimely and failed to identify any exculpatory *Brady* material.

4. The Trial and Post-Trial Motions

The trial lasted two weeks. The jury returned guilty verdicts against Mr. Stein on all charges.

Mr. Stein filed several post-trial motions, including two motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The newly discovered evidence included, among other documents, a publicly-filed SEC Form 8-K (“Exhibit X”) regarding an unrelated company whose Chief Financial Officer was named “Yossi Keret.” Mot. for New Trial Ex. J, Doc. 264-10. Mr. Stein alleged that Exhibit X was on the “SEC website.” *See* Mot. for New Trial, Doc. 264 at 9. Mr. Stein argued this document proved that Yossie (with an “e”) Keret, the man who purportedly signed the IT Healthcare purchase orders, was a real person, contrary to the government’s representation at trial. He contended that his conviction thus “was based on the perjured testimony of key Government witnesses and exclusion of crucial exculpatory and impeachment evidence as a result of prosecutorial misconduct.” *Id.* at 1; *see also* 2d Mot. for New Trial, Doc. 312 at 2, 8-9. Mr. Stein also filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing on his motions for new trial and a motion to compel documents from the SEC database. The district court summarily denied these motions.

A little more than a year after the trial, in an SEC enforcement action against Signalife's successor company, the SEC produced about two million documents from its database. Within this collection, Mr. Stein found a copy of Exhibit X, the publicly-available SEC document containing the name "Yossi Keret." Based on this document, Mr. Stein filed a third motion for new trial and accompanying motion for a hearing, arguing that the document was exculpatory and had been withheld in violation of *Brady*.

The district court denied the third motion for a new trial and the corresponding motion for an evidentiary hearing. The court found that there had been "no showing that the person named 'Yossi Keret' in [Exhibit X was] the same person connected to the [IT Healthcare purchase order confirmation and purchase order cancellation] upon which [Defendant's convictions] . . . are based." Doc. 388 at 2. The court further found there was no evidence showing that the prosecution team possessed this document and knowingly withheld it.

5. The Sentencing

Before Mr. Stein's sentencing, the probation office issued a presentence investigation report ("PSI"). Under the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, the PSI calculated a base offense level of 7 and recommended several enhancements and one reduction. Relevant to this appeal, the PSI recommended a 24-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(M) based on a loss calculation of more than \$50 million but less than \$100 million. Mr. Stein objected to this proposed calculation of loss,

contending that there was no actual loss to any investor.

The government proposed a method for calculating actual loss coined the “buyer’s only” method, which was based on actual purchase and sales data. Tr. of Sentencing Proceedings, Doc. 429 at 30. Under this method, the court would consider only “those customers who only purchased Signalife shares during the fraudulent period,” defined as September 20, 2007 (the date of the first false press release) through August 15, 2008 (the date of Signalife’s SEC filing noting that IT Healthcare had cancelled its purchase order). Tr. of Sentencing Proceedings, Doc. 428 at 25. The court would then “value the amount of those purchases . . . [and] subsequently subtract the value of those shares as of the end of the fraudulent period.” *Id.* at 42. The government identified 2,415 unique investors who bought Signalife stock during the fraudulent period and subsequently lost a total of \$13,186,025.85.⁶

Mr. Stein objected to this method, contending that the government needed to show both “but for” causation (reliance) and proximate causation (“that the causal connection between the conduct and the loss is not too attenuated”). Doc. 428 at 220. As regards “but for” causation, Mr. Stein argued there was no evidence that the 2,415 investors actually relied on false press releases or other fraudulent information promulgated by Mr. Stein. He noted that only one investor testified at trial that he had relied

⁶ The government proposed other methods for calculating actual loss, but the district court declined to adopt them.

on one of Mr. Stein's false press releases and only one investor provided a victim impact statement to the same effect. Although Mr. Stein acknowledged that a number of other investors provided victim impact statements, he emphasized that none of these investors specified that he or she relied on the false information he released.

The government responded that many of the victims' impact statements showed they relied on press releases generally (albeit not necessarily the specific press releases Mr. Stein disseminated) in purchasing Signalife stock. The government urged that this evidence was enough to infer reliance for all 2,415 investors identified. The government also relied on testimony that the only source for information about Signalife stock was press releases and public filings, and at least some investors probably relied on this type of information.

Regarding proximate cause, Mr. Stein argued that the government needed to "take into account . . . extrinsic market factors." Doc. 428 at 221. He noted that other circuits require this and that the Sentencing Guidelines specifically contemplate it. He identified specific events unrelated to the fraud that he contended caused the stock price to decline during the fraudulent period, including the 2008 financial crisis and the rampant short selling of Signalife stock. Mr. Stein urged the district court to reject the government's actual loss calculation because it failed to tease out these external market factors. The government responded simply, "The offense [Mr. Stein committed] was luring people in to invest in this stock. . . . Did they

then lose money? Of course. Was that reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Stein? Of course, it was. That's the Government's position here, Your Honor." *Id.* at 242.

The district court adopted the buyer's only method over Mr. Stein's objections. It concluded that there was "sufficient evidence to demonstrate both reliance and causation of damage to the shareholders." Doc. 429 at 30. Based on over \$13 million in actual loss, the court applied a 20-level increase to Mr. Stein's base offense level. *See* U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K).⁷ The court also imposed a 6-level enhancement because there were more than 250 victims. *See id.* § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C). With other enhancements and reductions not at issue here, Mr. Stein's total offense level was 45, resulting in an advisory guidelines sentence of life imprisonment. The district court found that this range was "certainly way above what would be sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the requirements of [18 U.S.C. §] 3553," Doc. 429 at 70, and varied downward, sentencing Mr. Stein to 204 months' imprisonment. The government then filed a motion for judgment of restitution, asking the district court to use the same actual loss figure to award \$13,186,025.85 to 2,415 Signalife investors. Mr. Stein waived his right to a hearing but filed a response arguing, again, that the government failed to prove reliance and proximate cause. The district court rejected this argument and granted the government's motion. This appeal followed.

⁷ Under the applicable 2012 Sentencing Guidelines, a loss of more than \$7 million but less than \$20 million resulted in a 20-level enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K).

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Conviction Issues

Mr. Stein argues that the government violated *Brady* and *Giglio*, and thus the district court erred in denying his motions for a new trial. We review *de novo* alleged *Brady* or *Giglio* violations. *United States v. Brester*, 786 F.3d 1335, 1339 (11th Cir. 2015); *United States v. Jones*, 601 F.3d 1247, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). We review the district court's denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. *United States v. Vallejo*, 297 F.3d 1154, 1163 (11th Cir. 2002). As explained below, we find no basis for vacating Mr. Stein's convictions.

1. The *Brady* Claims

Mr. Stein first argues that the government's failure to produce material, exculpatory evidence contained in the SEC's database violated *Brady*. "[T]he burden to show a *Brady* violation lies with the defendant, not the government . . ." *United States v. Esquenazi*, 752 F.3d 912, 933 (11th Cir. 2014). To establish a *Brady* violation, Mr. Stein must show that:

- (1) the government possessed favorable evidence to the defendant;
- (2) the defendant does not possess the evidence and could not obtain the evidence with any reasonable diligence;
- (3) the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and
- (4) had the evidence been disclosed to the defendant, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.

Vallejo, 297 F.3d at 1164.

Mr. Stein argues that the government violated *Brady* by failing to disclose Exhibit X, a document filed with the SEC showing that a person named “Yossi Keret” (not Yossie with an “e”) was an officer of a company unrelated to any of the players in this case. According to Mr. Stein, this document suggests that Yossie Keret, the man who purportedly signed the IT Healthcare purchase orders, was a real person.⁸

Mr. Stein’s argument fails for two reasons. First, Exhibit X contains no information favorable to Mr. Stein. Evidence is favorable to the accused for *Brady* purposes if “it is either exculpatory or impeaching.” *United States v. Naranjo*, 634 F.3d 1198, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Stephens v. Hall*, 407 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir. 2005)). Exhibit X is neither. Contrary to Mr. Stein’s contention, Exhibit X does not contradict Mr. Carter’s testimony that Yossie Keret was a fabricated name and not an officer of IT Healthcare. Not only is the name Yossi Keret on Exhibit X spelled differently from the name Yossie Keret on some of Mr. Stein’s fabricated documents, but also Exhibit X indicates that Yossi Keret is affiliated with a different company, not IT Healthcare. Thus, the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Stein had made “no showing that the person [referenced in Exhibit X was] the same person

⁸ The only other document Mr. Stein identifies as supporting a *Brady* claim is a CHM change of address letter that Mr. Carter purportedly created. Oddly, this letter showed Mr. Carter’s wife’s uncle as the sender on behalf of CHM. It is unclear how this document could be considered exculpatory, but in any event it cannot support a *Brady* violation because the government produced the letter to Mr. Stein before trial.

connected to the wires upon which [Defendant's convictions] . . . are based," Doc. 388 at 2, was not erroneous. Mr. Stein failed to prove that Exhibit X was exculpatory or impeaching; thus, this document cannot be the basis of a *Brady* violation.

Second, even if Exhibit X were favorable to Mr. Stein, he failed to show that he was unable to locate it with reasonable diligence. "[T]he government is not obliged under *Brady* to furnish a defendant with information which he already has or, with any reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself." *United States v. Valera*, 845 F.2d 923, 928 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting *United States v. Prior*, 546 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1977)); *see, e.g., United States v. Hansen*, 262 F.3d 1217, 1235 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the government's failure to disclose court opinions, which "were all available through legal research," does not violate *Brady*). Mr. Stein conceded that Exhibit X was a publicly available document filed with a public agency. Although in some cases a publicly available document practically may be unobtainable with reasonable diligence, *see, e.g., Milke v. Ryan*, 711 F.3d 998, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2013),⁹

⁹ In *Milke*, the defendant's postconviction team of "approximately ten researchers . . . spent nearly 7000 hours sifting through court records." *Milke*, 711 F.3d at 1018. "The team worked eight hours a day for three and a half months, turning up 100 [relevant] cases Another researcher then spent a month reading motions and transcripts from those cases to find [the *Brady* material]." *Id.* The court held that no reasonably diligent lawyer could have found this material in time to use at trial. *Id.*; *see also United States v. Payne*, 63 F.3d 1200, 1209 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting the argument that "the government's duty to produce [an exculpatory document in its

Mr. Stein made no effort to establish that this is such a case. In fact, Mr. Stein represented that he located the document on the “SEC website.” *See* Mot. for New Trial, Doc. 264 at 9. For these reasons, Mr. Stein failed to satisfy his burden of proving a *Brady* violation based on Exhibit X.¹⁰

2. The *Giglio* Claims

Mr. Stein next argues that the government violated *Giglio* by knowingly relying on false testimony. “*Giglio* error, a species of *Brady* error, occurs when the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the prosecution’s case included perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury.” *Ford v. Hall*, 546 F.3d 1326, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). *Giglio* also applies where the prosecutor herself made “explicit factual representations” to the court or “implicit factual representations to the jury,” knowing that those representations were false. *United States v. Alzate*, 47 F.3d 1103, 1110 (11th Cir. 1995).

“To prevail on a *Giglio* claim, a [defendant] must establish that (1) the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony; and (2) such use was material *i.e.*, that there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could

possession] was eliminated by that document’s availability in a public court file”).

¹⁰ The government also argued that Exhibit X was not in its possession for *Brady* purposes. Because we reject Mr. Stein’s *Brady* argument on other grounds, we do not reach this issue.

have affected the judgment.” *Ford*, 546 F.3d at 1331-32 (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted); accord *Guzman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.*, 663 F.3d 1336, 1348 (11th Cir. 2011). “The could have standard requires a new trial unless the prosecution persuades the court that the false testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Guzman*, 663 F.3d at 1348 (quoting *Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.*, 572 F.3d 1327, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2009)). Thus, “*Giglio’s* materiality standard is more defense-friendly than *Brady’s*.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

In addition, because *Giglio* error is a type of *Brady* violation, the defendant generally must identify evidence the government withheld that would have revealed the falsity of the testimony. See, e.g., *Ford*, 546 F.3d at 1331 (emphasizing that *Giglio* error “occurs when the *undisclosed* evidence demonstrates that the prosecutor’s case included perjured testimony” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, “[t]here is no violation of due process resulting from prosecutorial non-disclosure of false testimony if defense counsel is aware of it and fails to object.” *Routly v. Singletary*, 33 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that because defense counsel was aware that a false statement was subject to impeachment and yet failed to object to the statement, there was no due process violation under *Giglio*). But where the government not only fails to correct materially false testimony but also affirmatively capitalizes on it, the defendant’s due process rights are violated despite the government’s timely disclosure of evidence showing the falsity. See

DeMarco v. United States, 928 F.2d 1074, 1076-77 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new trial despite no suppression of evidence where the prosecutor not only failed to correct false testimony, but also capitalized on the false testimony in closing argument); *United States v. Sanfilippo*, 564 F.2d 176, 178-79 (5th Cir. 1977) (same).

Mr. Stein identifies several categories of statements he contends were false, but none of them supports a *Giglio* violation, and only two merit discussion: (1) statements the prosecutor made to the court and during his closing argument regarding Thomas Tribou and (2) testimony of Ms. Jones and Mr. Woodbury about the bogus purchase orders.

a. Thomas Tribou

Mr. Stein first argues that the government knowingly made false representations to the court about Thomas Tribou—a Signalife consultant who paid the company \$50,000 shortly after the date of the CHM purchase order—and then relied on that false representation in its closing argument in violation of *Giglio*. Specifically, Mr. Stein points us to two allegedly false representations the government made to the district court and one made to the jury. This argument fails because the government made no material false representations.

Mr. Stein's argument as it pertains to all three representations arises out of his attempt near the end of trial to admit into evidence a copy of an October 24, 2007 email from Signalife's CEO's administrative assistant, Ms. Jones, to Signalife's certified public accountant, Norma Provencio, which

was forwarded to Signalife's corporate counsel, Mr. Woodbury. The subject line of the email said, "[Fwd: Emailing: Tribou Payment]," and in the body, Ms. Provencio noted, "Attached is the \$50K deposit on the 9-14 purchase order." Am. Resp. in Opp. to Def.'s Mots. for New Trial Ex. 1, Doc. 298-1 at 37. The exhibit also included a copy of the referenced September 27, 2007 check for \$50,000 to Signalife, apparently signed by Delores Tribou out of an account shared with her husband, Thomas. The check displayed the CHM purchase order number on the memo line, along with the words "Tribou & Assoc." Doc. 298-1 at 38.

Mr. Stein sought to use this exhibit to support the inference that the September 14, 2007 CHM purchase order, which called for a \$50,000 deposit, was legitimate. The government objected on the ground that the email's contents were hearsay. The district court sustained the objection and noted that Mr. Stein failed to authenticate the document. The court ultimately brokered the following stipulation: "On or about September 27th, 2007, an individual named Thomas Tribou paid Signalife \$50,000 for goods he expected to receive." Mr. Stein, through counsel, accepted this stipulation, which was presented to the jury. Mr. Stein did not call Mr. Tribou as a witness.

After the district court sustained the government's hearsay objection, the government made two representations to the court that Mr. Stein argues were false. First, the government represented that, based on interviews Mr. Tribou previously had given to SEC investigators, if Mr. Tribou were called

to testify he would say that although he paid \$50,000 to Signalife, he never received any product and was not a Signalife reseller.¹¹ Mr. Stein argues that this representation is inconsistent with statements Mr. Tribou made to SEC investigators admitting that he signed the CHM purchase order.

We reject this argument. Mr. Tribou's statement to SEC investigators that he signed the CHM purchase order in no way indicates he would have testified that he actually received Signalife products. Nor does it show that Mr. Tribou considered himself a Signalife reseller. And, in any case, Mr. Tribou's SEC testimony was, as Mr. Stein himself characterized it, "extremely inconsistent." Doc. 247 at 55. On this record, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor spoke falsely when he told the district court how he believed Mr. Tribou would testify at trial.

Second, on the district court's request, the government privately telephoned Mr. Tribou and then relayed to the court and the defense the contents of that telephone call, which, according to Mr. Stein, included a false statement. The government told the court that during the call Mr. Tribou never denied giving Signalife a \$50,000 check, but he said that he was unfamiliar with Tribou & Associates and that he doubted he wrote the purchase order number on the check. Mr. Tribou

¹¹ The government also told the district court that Mr. Tribou likely would testify that he had no connection with CHM and that he agreed to Mr. Stein's request to sign a blank purchase order. Mr. Stein does not challenge these representations on appeal.

previously had told an SEC investigator that Tribou & Associates was his name “for consulting and everything on [his] personal taxes.” 2d Mot. for New Trial Ex. A, Doc. 312-1 at 8. Thus, Mr. Stein argues, the government knew or should have known that Mr. Tribou was lying about his unfamiliarity with Tribou & Associates and yet relayed the lie to the court nonetheless.

We reject Mr. Stein’s argument about the second representation for two reasons. First, Mr. Stein contends not that the prosecutor misrepresented what Mr. Tribou told him on the call, but rather that the prosecutor should have flagged for the court the inconsistency between what Mr. Tribou said on the call and what he had said to SEC investigators in the past. But it is well-established that “a prior statement that is merely inconsistent with a government witness’s testimony is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct.” *United States v. McNair*, 605 F.3d 1152, 1208 (11th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases); *accord Hays v. Alabama*, 85 F.3d 1492, 1499 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that there was no due process violation arising out of a witness’s inconsistent testimony where there was “no showing that [the witness’s] later, rather than earlier, testimony was false”).

Second, even if false, the government’s representation regarding Mr. Tribou was immaterial. A material misrepresentation occurs when there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment. *Guzman*, 663 F.3d at 1348. Mr. Stein argues that the representation influenced the court’s decision to sustain the

government's objection on hearsay grounds to the admission of the check and the email. We disagree. The court sustained the objection before the government made the representations about Mr. Tribou. Moreover, the court based its ruling on hearsay grounds and Mr. Stein's failure to authenticate the documents rather than anything Mr. Tribou might say if called to testify. Mr. Stein fails to explain how the government's statements had any bearing on this evidentiary decision, which Mr. Stein expressly does not challenge on appeal.

The third allegedly false statement occurred during the government's closing argument. The prosecutor told the jury that the CHM purchase order was "all made up" and "fake," statements Mr. Stein argues constituted misrepresentations because Mr. Tribou signed the purchase order and paid Signalife \$50,000. Doc. 248 at 34. But the prosecutor's statement and these facts are not mutually exclusive. The fact that Mr. Stein obtained Mr. Tribou's signature and check does not rule out the possibility that he also fabricated the purchase order. Indeed, the government made this argument in its rebuttal, stating that regardless of any signatures Mr. Stein obtained, the purchase orders were fake. Moreover, the record contained overwhelming evidence that Mr. Stein fabricated supporting documentation for the purchase orders and used arbitrary names for companies and individuals supposedly purchasing Signalife products. On this record, we cannot conclude that the government violated *Giglio* with its characterization

of evidence about the CHM purchase order.¹² *See Maharaj v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr.*, 432 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2005) (“In the *Giglio* context, the suggestion that a statement may have been false is simply insufficient; the defendant must conclusively show that the statement was actually false.”).

In sum, Mr. Tribou’s previous inconsistent statements to SEC investigators and the ambiguity regarding his role in signing the CHM purchase order and paying \$50,000 to Signalife provide an insufficient basis for us to conclude that the government knowingly relied on materially false testimony.

b. Jones and Woodbury

Mr. Stein next argues that (1) Mr. Harmison’s assistant, Ms. Jones, lied when she characterized the three purchase orders as “phantom purchase orders” simply because she lacked supporting documentation, and (2) Signalife’s securities lawyer, Mr. Woodbury, lied when he said he got all his information about the purchase orders from Mr. Stein. Again, Mr. Stein relies on the October 24, 2007

¹² Mr. Stein also argues that the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence when he asked the jury, “[I]f Tom Tribou, Thomas Tribou, is [CHM], [then] where’s Tom Tribou’s name, Thomas Tribou’s name [on the purchase order]? . . . Take a look closely . . . See if Thomas Tribou’s name appears on there.” Doc. 248 at 114. Mr. Stein argues that Mr. Tribou’s name (in the form of his signature) *does* appear on the purchase order. But that was not the point of the government’s argument. In fact, in closing, the government conceded that Mr. Stein may have obtained a signature on the CHM purchase order. The point—which was true—was that the purchase order did not identify Mr. Tribou as an officer of CHM.

email and the copy of the \$50,000 Tribou check, which was received by Ms. Jones and Mr. Woodbury, as demonstrating these lies. But Mr. Stein offers no argument that the prosecutor capitalized on the allegedly false testimony that contradicts this evidence, which he needed to show because none of this evidence was suppressed.¹³ In fact, the record shows that Mr. Stein located the email and the check before trial and even produced them to the government. In the absence of government suppression of the evidence, then, there can be no *Giglio* violation. See *Ford*, 546 F.3d at 1331; *DeMarco*, 928 F.2d at 1076. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Stein's *Giglio* argument.¹⁴

3. Mr. Stein's Remaining Arguments

Mr. Stein argues that the district court erred when it denied (1) the third motion for new trial without considering the alleged prosecutorial

¹³ To be sure, the prosecutor mentioned in passing in his closing argument that Ms. Jones referred to the purchase orders as "phantom purchase orders," but unlike in *DeMarco*, the prosecutor did not emphasize or capitalize on this statement by repeating it or making it the centerpiece of an argument for guilt. *DeMarco*, 928 F.2d at 1076-77 (noting that the prosecutor not only adopted the false statement but also emphasized it in her jury argument). Moreover, the prosecutor never mentioned Ms. Jones's statement that she received no backup for the purchase orders, which was the material aspect of her testimony.

¹⁴ In support of his *Brady* and *Giglio* arguments, Mr. Stein filed a motion for the Court to take judicial notice of portions of a transcript from a summary judgment hearing in the SEC enforcement action against him, Heart Tronics, Inc., and various other defendants. We GRANT this motion but find nothing in the transcript that changes our decision here.

misconduct cumulatively and (2) the motions to compel discovery and for an evidentiary hearing regarding the alleged *Brady* and *Giglio* violations. We review these denials for an abuse of discretion. *See Vallejo*, 297 F.3d at 1163 (motion for new trial); *United States v. Schlei*, 122 F.3d 944, 990 (11th Cir. 1997) (evidentiary hearing); *Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp.*, 443 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 2006) (motion to compel discovery). Because there were no *Brady* or *Giglio* violations, there was no cumulative reversible error. *See United States v. Carter*, 776 F.3d 1309, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015). And Mr. Stein has failed to show how the district court's decision not to hold a hearing and compel discovery was an abuse of discretion.¹⁵ We find no basis for vacating his conviction in Mr. Stein's remaining arguments. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction and move on to his sentence.

B. The Sentencing Issues

Mr. Stein raises several challenges to his sentence, only one of which warrants discussion. Mr. Stein asserts that the district court erred in calculating actual loss for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) and for restitution under the MVRA. The district court's actual loss calculation was

¹⁵ In a footnote in his opening brief, buried within his *Brady* argument, Mr. Stein makes a passing reference to an alleged violation of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Such a passing reference, without any reasoned analysis whatsoever, is insufficient to preserve the argument on appeal. *See United States v. Jernigan*, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (deeming issue abandoned where defendant made only passing references to it in brief). Accordingly, we do not address it. *See id.*

premised on an estimate of losses suffered by 2,415 investors in Signalife stock during the fraudulent period. Mr. Stein argues that the actual loss calculation was too high because the court (1) presumed, without an adequate factual basis, that each investor relied on fraudulent information he disseminated and (2) failed to take into account intervening events that led to a decline in the price of Signalife stock.¹⁶

“We review a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines *de novo*, and the determination of the amount of loss involved in the offense for clear error.” *United States v. Maxwell*, 579 F.3d 1282, 1305 (11th Cir. 2009). A district court’s determination that a person or entity was a victim for purposes of loss calculation is an interpretation of the guidelines, so we review it *de novo*. *United States v. Martin*, 803 F.3d 581, 593 (11th Cir. 2015). A district court’s determination of proximate cause, however, is part of the court’s determination of the amount of loss involved in the offense and, thus, is reviewed only for clear error. *Id.* “We will overturn a court’s loss calculation under the clear-error standard where we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” *United States v. Campbell*, 765 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¹⁶ Mr. Stein also challenges the district court’s estimate of the number of victims under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C), which resulted in an additional 6-level enhancement. This argument is intertwined with Mr. Stein’s § 2B1.1(b)(1) argument, and thus we do not address it separately.

First, we provide an overview of loss calculation principles for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines and restitution under the MVRA. Then we consider Mr. Stein’s arguments regarding reliance (factual causation) and intervening events (legal causation).

1. Loss Calculation under the Guidelines and the MVRA

Section 2B1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides a table for determining the level of enhancement based on the loss attributable to the offense. This loss calculation “serves as a proxy for ‘the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s relative culpability.’” *Campbell*, 765 F.3d at 1301 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. background). In financial fraud cases, the loss calculation often drives the sentence. *See, e.g., United States v. Olis*, 429 F.3d 540, 545 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The most significant determinant of [the defendant’s] sentence is the guidelines loss calculation.”); *United States v. Robles*, No. CR 04-1594(B)SVW, 2015 WL 1383756, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) (“[T]he loss calculation in this case is the primary driver behind the Guidelines range—more than doubling the offense level and tripling the suggested sentence”); *United States v. Faulkenberry*, 759 F. Supp. 2d 915, 928 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (“[T]he harsh sentence recommended by the Guidelines is primarily driven by the loss calculation, which increases [the defendant’s] Base Offense Level by 30 points.”).

There are two ways to measure loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, actual and intended loss, and we are instructed to take the greater of the two. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(A). Here, however, the government

did not argue for an intended loss calculation; we thus focus on the calculation of actual loss.

The government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence actual loss attributable to the defendant's conduct. *United States v. Rodriguez*, 751 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2014). “[A] sentencing court is not generally required to make detailed findings of individualized losses to each victim.” *United States v. Orton*, 73 F.3d 331, 335 (11th Cir. 1996) (considering the similar predecessor guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1). Instead, the court may employ a variety of methods to derive a “reasonable estimate of the loss” to the victims based on the information available to the district court. *United States v. Snyder*, 291 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002); accord *United States v. Ford*, 784 F.3d 1386, 1396 (11th Cir. 2015); see also U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(iv) (providing that district courts should “tak[e] into account, as appropriate and practical under the circumstances,” a variety of factors including the “approximate number of victims multiplied by the average loss to each victim”). Although the district court may estimate the amount of loss, it cannot “speculate about the existence of facts and must base its estimate on reliable and specific evidence.” *Ford*, 784 F.3d at 1396; accord *United States v. Sepulveda*, 115 F.3d 882, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1997).

Under the guidelines, “[a]ctual loss . . . is defined as the ‘reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.’” *Campbell*, 765 F.3d at 1302 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i)). This definition “incorporates [a] causation standard that,

at a minimum, requires factual causation (often called ‘but for’ causation) and provides a rule for legal causation (*i.e.*, guidance to courts regarding how to draw the line as to what losses should be included and excluded from the loss determination).” U.S.S.G. App. C, Vol. II at 178, Amend. 617 (Nov. 1, 2001); *see United States v. Evans*, 744 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[Section] 2B1.1 incorporates and requires both factual or ‘but for’ causation and legal or foreseeable causation.”); *United States v. Peppel*, 707 F.3d 627, 643-44 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that, to establish actual loss under § 2B1.1, the government must “establish both cause in fact and legal causation by a preponderance of the evidence”); *see also Burrage v. United States*, 134 S. Ct. 881, 887-91 (2014) (holding that the ordinary meaning of the term “results from” in a criminal statute requires “but-for causality”).

The MVRA requires the district court to calculate actual loss “to identifiable victims of certain crimes, including crimes of fraud.” *Martin*, 803 F.3d at 592. Under the MVRA, the district court must award restitution to such victims “without regard to the defendant’s ability to pay.” *Id.* The method for calculating actual loss, as opposed to intended loss, under the Sentencing Guidelines is “largely the same” as the method for establishing actual loss to identifiable victims under the MVRA. *United States v. Cavallo*, 790 F.3d 1202, 1239 (11th Cir. 2015). In most cases, the amount of actual loss under the guidelines will be the same as the restitution figure. *Id.* Thus, it is unsurprising that to prove a victim suffered an actual loss under the MVRA, the government must establish both factual and legal

causation in essentially the same manner as it must show causation under the guidelines—by proving but for and proximate causation. *See, e.g., Martin*, 803 F.3d at 594; *United States v. Robertson*, 493 F.3d 1322, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2007). Here the district court used the same figure for actual loss under the guidelines and the MVRA. Thus, we analyze the two calculations together, considering first factual and then legal causation.

2. Reliance (Factual Causation)

The parties agree that the government must show that the investors relied on Mr. Stein's fraudulent information to satisfy the "but for" causation requirement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. *See also Currie v. Cayman Res. Corp.*, 835 F.2d 780, 785 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Reliance is . . . a type of 'but for' requirement." (quoting *Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean*, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), *aff'd in part and rev'd in part*, 459 U.S. 375 (1983))). The government also must show reliance to prove "but for" causation for restitution purposes. *See Martin*, 803 F.3d at 594. The parties disagree on what this showing must entail.

As we see it, the government may show reliance in a securities fraud case either through direct evidence or specific circumstantial evidence. The government may of course introduce individualized evidence of reliance—that is, direct evidence that each individual investor read the false information and relied on it when deciding to purchase stock. *See United States v. Ebberts*, 458 F.3d 110, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that reliance can be shown for loss calculation purposes under § 2B1.1 by offering

evidence to demonstrate “express reliance on the accuracy of the [fraudulent] financial statements”). But, as the district court aptly recognized, requiring individualized proof of reliance for each investor is often infeasible or impossible. *See Basic Inc. v. Levinson*, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988) (recognizing in civil securities fraud context that requiring direct proof of reliance may be “an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market”); *Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp.*, 762 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014) (same). Thus, in cases such as this one involving numerous investors, the government may instead offer specific circumstantial evidence from which the district court may reasonably conclude that all of the investors relied on the defendant’s fraudulent information.

Here, though, the government failed to satisfy either of these options. As a result, the district court’s statement that “from the record that there [was] sufficient evidence to demonstrate . . . reliance” for 2,415 investors was erroneous. Tr. of Sentencing Proceedings, Doc. 429 at 30. The record contains no direct, individualized evidence of reliance for each investor. And the circumstantial evidence in the record is far too limited to support a finding that 2,415 investors relied on the fraudulent information Mr. Stein disseminated. The only evidence arguably supporting the reliance finding was: (1) trial testimony from one investor that he relied on one of Mr. Stein’s false press releases; (2) a victim impact statement from another investor to the same effect; (3) a number of victim impact statements suggesting

that the investors relied on press releases and other publicly available information generally, but not specifically the fraudulent information Mr. Stein disseminated; and (4) testimony that, because the only place to get information about Signalife stock was from press releases and public filings, at least some investors likely relied on this type of information. This evidence standing alone is insufficient to support the inference that *all* 2,415 investors relied on Mr. Stein's fraudulent information when deciding to purchase Signalife stock. On this thin record, the district court "engage[d] in the kind of speculation forbidden by the Sentencing Guidelines." *United States v. Bradley*, 644 F.3d 1213, 1292 (11th Cir. 2011); *see Sepulveda*, 115 F.3d at 890-91. Accordingly, the district court's actual loss calculation was in error.

We therefore vacate Mr. Stein's sentence, which was based on a guidelines calculation founded on the erroneous actual loss figure, and remand for a recalculation of actual losses. On remand, the government may again seek to prove actual loss by showing losses suffered by Signalife investors. Alternatively, the government may also seek to prove actual loss through direct losses to the company resulting from, for example, Mr. Stein's theft of Signalife stock. *See* U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(i). And if the district court determines that the loss "reasonably cannot be determined," the court may use instead "the gain that resulted from the offense." *Id.* § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(B).¹⁷

¹⁷ The government raises a harmless error argument, which we reject. According to the government, the district court

3. Intervening Events (Legal Causation)

We next turn to the requirement of legal causation, and, in particular, whether the district court erred in failing to take into account intervening events that may have contributed to investors' losses. The standard for legal causation for purposes of the actual loss calculation is essentially the same under the guidelines and the MVRA. *See Cavallo*, 790 F.3d at 1239. Under the guidelines, “[a]ctual loss’ means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i). A reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm is one “that the defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should have known, was a potential result of the offense.” *Id.* § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iv). Thus, the legal cause standard we use under § 2B1.1(b) is reasonable foreseeability.

We also consider reasonable foreseeability when assessing proximate cause for purposes of actual loss under the MVRA. *See, e.g., Martin*, 803 F.3d at 594; *Robertson*, 493 F.3d at 1334-35. In *Martin*, the defendant fraudulently obtained loans that later were sold to successor lenders. *Martin*, 803 F.3d at 586-87. The district court relied on losses suffered by these successor lenders when estimating actual loss

could have calculated actual loss based on the value of assets Mr. Stein stole from Signalife or, if loss “reasonably cannot be determined,” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(B), by estimating Mr. Stein’s gain. Had the court used these alternative figures, the government argues, the Sentencing Guidelines range would have been the same. But the district court made no factual findings regarding the value of stolen assets or Mr. Stein’s financial gain, and we will not make those findings in the first instance.

for restitution purposes. *Id.* at 592-93. We upheld the district court’s loss calculation, holding that the successor lenders could recover restitution under the MVRA because it “was entirely foreseeable to [the defendant] not only that the original lenders would rely on the fraudulent applications, but that the mortgages would be resold to other lenders that would rely on the applications as well.” *Id.* at 594. Put differently, because the intervening event—the sale of the loan to a successor lender—was reasonably foreseeable, it did not “break the chain of causation.” *Id.* (citing *Robertson*, 493 F.3d at 1334-35).¹⁸

In *Robertson*, in contrast, we vacated a restitution award because there was inadequate evidence to find that intervening events between the fraud and the loss were reasonably foreseeable. 493 F.3d at 1334-35. The defendant fraudulently obtained computer software from Novell, Inc. and then sold the software to Network Systems Technology, Inc. *Id.* at 1327-28. Network Systems resold the software at a profit. *Id.* at 1328. At some later point, Novell sued Network Systems in a case involving the software purchased from the defendant. *Id.* The record did not indicate the precise ground for the lawsuit. *Id.* Network Systems settled the lawsuit by agreeing to pay Novell \$125,000. *Id.*

The district court determined that Network Systems was a victim for purposes of the MVRA, but

¹⁸ We vacated the restitution award in *Martin*, however, because the district court failed to take into account the amount the successor lenders paid to acquire the mortgages. *Martin*, 803 F.3d at 595-96.

we reversed. *Id.* at 1334-35. “Whether the lawsuit and settlement were reasonably foreseeable consequences of [the defendant’s] fraud on Novell,” we explained, “depends on the nature of the litigation.” *Id.* at 1335. All the government had established at sentencing, we noted, was “that the litigation was ‘related to’ the units of software” the defendant sold, and this “vague description” was insufficient to support the district court’s finding that the lawsuit and settlement were reasonably foreseeable. *Id.* Thus, we held that the district court erred in finding that Network Systems was a victim under the MVRA, and we vacated the \$125,000 restitution award. *Id.* at 1335-36.

In sum, the causation standards for determining actual loss under the Sentencing Guidelines and for restitution purposes are similar. When calculating actual loss for either purpose, the district court should take into account intervening events contributing to the loss unless those events also were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. *See id.* at 1334.

At sentencing, Mr. Stein urged the district court in arriving at its loss and restitution calculations to consider that Signalife stock value declined in part because of the short selling of over 22 million shares of Signalife stock and the across-the-board stock market decline of 2008.¹⁹ The district court failed to

¹⁹ Although Mr. Stein offered expert testimony regarding the stock market decline, it is unclear whether he offered proof that the short selling occurred or how it may have depressed stock prices.

consider these factors, and Mr. Stein argues that this was error. We agree.

Once Mr. Stein pointed to intervening events that may have affected the stock price, the district court was obliged to make findings regarding the effects of these intervening events, if any, and whether these events were reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Stein. Because the court failed to do so, we vacate the sentencing order. On remand, the district court should determine whether these intervening events affected Signalife's stock price during the fraudulent period and, if so, whether they nonetheless were reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Stein. If the district court finds that these or any other intervening event reduced the value of Signalife stock during the fraudulent period and that the events were not reasonably foreseeable, the district court, to the extent possible, should approximate the effect of such intervening events and subtract this amount from its actual loss calculation.²⁰

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm Mr. Stein's judgment of conviction because we find no *Brady* or *Giglio* violations, but we

²⁰ Mr. Stein also urges us to follow the lead of two of our sister circuits in importing the proximate cause principles from the civil fraud context, *see Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo*, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), into the sentencing context for purposes of calculating actual loss. *See United States v. Rutkoske*, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007); *United States v. Olis*, 429 F.3d 540, 545-49 (5th Cir. 2005). We decline his invitation because we believe our reasonable foreseeability test strikes the right balance for calculating actual loss under the Sentencing Guidelines and for purposes of restitution.

vacate his sentence and remand to the district court with instructions to calculate anew the amount of loss for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) and restitution under the MVRA, consistent with this opinion. To reiterate, this calculation may be an estimate so long as it is based “on reliable and specific evidence” rather than mere speculation. *Ford*, 784 F.3d at 1396. In particular, on remand, if the government seeks to prove an actual loss figure based on losses suffered by Signalife investors, the government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the investors relied on fraudulent information Mr. Stein disseminated. As regards intervening events, if Mr. Stein again offers evidence that a particular event aside from his fraud depressed the stock price during the fraudulent period, the district court must find, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that such intervening event was also reasonably foreseeable or, instead, subtract from the actual loss amount the monetary effect of such intervening event.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, concurring:

As explained in the majority opinion, in seeking to establish loss in a securities fraud case, the government may show that investors relied on fraudulent information through either direct or specific circumstantial evidence. Although in some cases proving loss by direct evidence may be practicable, in many cases—including this one—it simply is not. This means that in most securities

fraud cases the government's best option likely will be to establish reliance via specific circumstantial evidence.

In this case, the government failed to offer sufficiently specific circumstantial evidence to support a finding that 2,415 investors relied on the false information Mr. Stein disseminated. *See United States v. Ford*, 784 F.3d 1386, 1396 (11th Cir. 2015) (requiring that the district court "make a reasonable estimate of the loss" based on available information). The government only had evidence that two investors relied on Mr. Stein's bogus press releases, and it presented little specific evidence that would permit the district court to extrapolate from that tiny two-person sample and arrive at a reasonable estimate of loss. Of course, this begs the question: At what point has the government offered sufficient evidence from which the district court may extrapolate a reasonable estimate? Is it purely a numbers game, whereby at some point the sample size of direct evidence of reliance is large enough that a district court's inferential leap that all investors relied is reasonable? I write to explain one potential method of proving reliance that could eliminate the numbers game and the speculation that, as in this case, accompanies it.

As two of our sister circuits have recognized, in seeking to show investors relied on fraudulent information disseminated to the public, the government could borrow from civil securities fraud cases and establish the so-called "*Basic* presumption." *Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp.*, 762 F.3d

1248, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing *Basic Inc. v. Levinson*, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988)); *United States v. Ebbers*, 458 F.3d 110, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing the *Basic* presumption as a means for proving reliance for purposes of loss calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1); see also *United States v. Peppel*, 707 F.3d 627, 646 (6th Cir. 2013) (same). “Under the *Basic* presumption, plaintiffs may benefit from a rebuttable presumption of class-wide reliance ‘based on what is known as the fraud-on-the-market theory.’” *Local 703*, 762 F.3d at 1254 (quoting *Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.*, 563 U.S. 804, 811 (2011)). “Fraud-on-the-market claims derive from the so-called efficient market hypothesis, which provides, in the words of the Supreme Court, that ‘in an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company and its business.’” *FindWhat Inv’r Grp. v. FindWhat.com*, 658 F.3d 1282, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Basic Inc.*, 485 U.S. at 241).

“If a market is generally efficient in incorporating publicly available information into a security’s market price, it is reasonable to presume that a particular public, material misrepresentation will be reflected in the security’s price.” *Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds*, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013). It is also reasonable to presume “that most investors . . . will rely on the security’s market price as an unbiased assessment of the security’s value in light of all public information.” *Id.* Thus, if the *Basic* presumption applies, the plaintiff may, subject to evidence in rebuttal, show reliance on a

classwide basis without resorting to individualized evidence.

To trigger the *Basic* presumption, the plaintiff generally must prove that (1) “the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known,” (2) “the stock traded in an efficient market,” and (3) “the relevant transaction took place between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was revealed.” *Local 703*, 762 F.3d at 1254 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also *Amgen, Inc.*, 133 S. Ct. at 1192-93; *FindWhat Inv’r Grp.*, 658 F.3d at 1310. Of these three elements, the second factor, known as informational efficiency, requires more explanation.

Informational efficiency refers to “a prediction or implication about the speed with which prices respond to information.” *In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 432 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005). “Determining whether a market is informationally efficient, therefore, involves analysis of the structure of the market and the speed with which all publicly available information is impounded in price.” *Id.* This determination is “fact-intensive” and demands flexibility. *Local 703*, 762 F.3d at 1254. Therefore, courts have not dictated “a comprehensive analytical framework for determining whether the market for a particular stock is efficient,” and instead have recognized “general characteristics of an efficient market” including “high-volume trading activity facilitated by people who analyze information about the stock or who make trades based upon that information.” *Id.* at 1254-55; see, e.g., *In re Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1339-

40 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (holding that the plaintiffs in a putative class action proved an efficient market sufficiently to trigger the *Basic* presumption of reliance and support a finding of predominance for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

The Second and Sixth Circuits have recognized that in appropriate cases the government may employ the *Basic* presumption to establish actual loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b) or the MVRA. *See Ebbbers*, 458 F.3d at 126-27 (recognizing that reliance can be shown for loss calculation purposes under § 2B1.1 by offering evidence to demonstrate “express reliance on the accuracy of the [fraudulent] financial statements,” or “reliance on what *Basic, Inc. v. Levinson* described as the ‘integrity’ of the existing market price”); *Peppel*, 707 F.3d at 646 (adopting the reasoning of *Ebbbers*). I find their reasoning persuasive. In my view, as in *Peppel*, if the government chooses to arrive at a loss amount attributable to the defendant based on the *Basic* presumption, it must offer evidence sufficient to establish each of the presumption’s three elements, described above. *See Peppel*, 707 F.3d at 632-33, 646 (describing the government’s evidence regarding the *Basic* presumption elements and holding that the evidence supported the district court’s loss calculation). Once the government establishes these elements, the defendant may challenge them with evidence of his own. *See Basic, Inc.*, 485 U.S. at 248-49. The defendant also may try to rebut the presumption with, for example, evidence that individual investors would have purchased the stock despite knowing the statements were false. *See id.*

There surely will be cases in which it is impracticable or otherwise inappropriate to employ the *Basic* presumption as a method for demonstrating reliance. If, for example, a defendant's fraud affected investors in an inefficient market, the *Basic* presumption will be of no use to the government or the district court. I do not mean to suggest that the government may never establish reliance by offering other types of specific circumstantial evidence (perhaps expert testimony) or, alternatively, a combination of direct evidence of some investors' reliance and circumstantial evidence to show that other investors were similarly situated. I simply offer my view that in appropriate cases the *Basic* presumption may be a feasible method for establishing reliance by specific and reliable circumstantial evidence.

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Appendix B

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT**

No. 14-15621-FF

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MITCHELL J. STEIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida

(Mar. 16, 2017)

ON PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND
PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING EN BANC

BEFORE: WILLIAM PRYOR and JILL PRYOR,
Circuit Judges, and STORY,* District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure), the Petition(s) for Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

* Honorable Richard W. Story, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

s/[handwritten: signature]

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

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Appendix C

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA**

No. 11-80205-CR

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff

v.

MITCHELL J. STEIN,
Defendant.

(June 9, 2014)

ORDER DENYING POST TRIAL MOTIONS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Mitchell Stein's post trial motions. This Court having reviewed the pertinent portions of the record and being duly advised in the premises, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendant's Motion for New Trial in the Interest of Justice Based Upon Newly Discovered Evidence, Request for Hearing [DE 260], Amended Motions for New Trial [DE's 279 and 280] and Second Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative, to Dismiss with Prejudice [DE 312] are DENIED. The Court finds these motions not only to be baseless, but also offensive.

2. Defendant's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Motion for New Trial [DE 261] is DENIED.

3. Defendant's Rule 29 Motion [DE 265] is DENIED. There was more than sufficient evidence presented upon which a reasonable jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant was guilty.

4. Defendant's Motion to Compel Production of Documents [DE 277] and Motion to Compel Production of Minutes and Transcripts of Grand Jury Proceedings and Incorporated Memorandum of Law [DE 332] are DENIED.

5. Defendant's Motion for Conditional Release Pending Sentencing [DE 278] is DENIED.

6. Defendant's Motions in Limine [DE's 143, 144, 175 and 178] are DENIED AS MOOT.

DONE and ORDERED in West Palm Beach, Florida, this 9th day of June, 2014.

s/[handwritten:signature]_____

KENNETH A. MARRA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE